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Abstract: Unlike in developed countries, the liberalization process in Indonesia began at a 
time when telecommunication infrastructure was minimal and teledensity was below 2%. 
The main aim of liberalization and sector reform is consequently to increase teledensity. 
However, the results of liberalization have not yet been envisaged. A decade after the 
introduction of liberalization and competition, teledensity growth and sector productivity 
still remain low.  The telecommunication sector's contribution to accelerating national 
economic growth in an effort to eradicate poverty, unemployment and improve national 
education has consequently been minimal.  
Given the minimal infrastructure and limited state budget available, specific strategies 
should be implemented focused on increasing teledensity as a priority.  Mainly in the 
transitional period, specific initiatives will be required to anticipate "cherry picking" by new 
entrants and reinforce their commitment to increasing network expansion. This begs the 
question of whether all WTO regulations should be fully implemented immediately? Upon 
setting up their gateway, new entrants can immediately capitalise on subscribers 
developed by the incumbent operator, particularly in the metropolitan and urban areas.  
Consequently, although the number of new players is rising, they are not attracting new 
subscribers and are failing to boost to penetration levels as a result. 
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rior to 1995, telecommunication service provision in Indonesia had 
been monopolized by two state-owned operators: the domestic 
provider PT Telekomunikasi Indonesia (TELKOM) and the 
international provider PT Indosat. Development of the telecommunications 
infrastructure, particularly funding of the national backbone network, was 
financed primarily by the state budget, mainly through soft loans from the 
World Bank, the Asean Development Bank and other bilateral foreign 
assistance under the broad umbrella of the Consultative Group on Indonesia 
(CGI). However, loans from these international agencies were reduced in 
early 1990 and totally stopped in 1995.  
Due to the limited state budget, accelerated telecommunications 
development can only be achieved by inviting contributions from local and 
P
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foreign investors. This was the strategic decision taken by the government to 
cater for market demand and to encourage industry growth. The 
telecommunications industry has consequently been progressively 
liberalized. In 1995 the cellular market and value added services were 
opened up to private operators. In the meantime, the privatization of state 
owned companies was also launched. In mid 2002 the government issued a 
new license for Indosat as a local provider and for long distance and 
international calls in April 2004. 
The main objective of this paper is to provide a brief analysis of the 
ineffectiveness of policies and regulation to accelerate penetration rates in 
Indonesia. The paper offers snapshots of significant pre-competition and 
private participation and examines the implications of inadequate fixed 
telephony infrastructure for other markets, the emergence of wireless and IP 
based services and the behaviour of the incumbent and new entrants. 
In developed countries, liberalization began when average teledensity 
was above 50%, or all households had access to a basic telephony service. 
Hence the WTO Reference Paper on Basic Telecommunication Services is 
truly aimed at creating opportunities for new entrants to compete with strong 
incumbents. The latter possessed an established network with which to 
monopolize their subscribers. Therefore, interconnection obligations and 
rules on lowering barriers to market entry such as carrier selection, number 
portability and local loop unbundling are more geared towards incumbents. 
In Indonesia, liberalization began at a time when telecommunication 
infrastructure was minimal and teledensity was below 2%. The government 
did not prepare its state-owned operator for liberalization. This was apparent 
from the incumbent's minimum capacity and poor network quality. The 
incumbent's un-readiness has created serious obstacles to promoting 
competition such as difficulties in satisfying interconnection obligations and 
the implementation of the carrier selection facility. 
In the meantime, WTO regulations have also been misinterpreted by new 
players to turn profits without committing to developing the network. The 
privilege of obtaining interconnection, for example, has led investors and 
new players to compete for VoIP, long distance and international call 
services only. Upon setting up their gateway, they can immediately profit 
from subscribers owned by the incumbent operator, particularly in 
metropolitan and urban areas. Consequently, although the number of new 
players is increasing, they are not attracting any new subscribers, and thus 
offer no boost to market penetration levels. To speed up infrastructure 
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development and anticipate "cherry picking," specific obligations must be 
applied to new entrants. The USO contribution is still insufficient to boost 
penetration. 
In the case of Indonesia, specific strategies are needed that prioritise 
increasing teledensity as the main goal of liberalization. The question is, 
whether all WTO regulations should be fully implemented immediately?  It 
will take a long time and significant investment to upgrade the incumbent's 
network and exchanges in order to provide competition facilities such as 
carrier selection, number portability and local loop unbundling. Consideration 
must consequently be given to how to finance the upgrading expenses 
involved in providing such competition facilities. 
This ineffective liberalization is also due the government's poor 
performance as a policy maker. An independent regulatory institution was 
only established nearly 10 years after liberalization, while the roles and 
functions of this body are not yet clear. The government is still reluctant to 
hand over its regulatory powers, thus restricting the regulatory body's ability 
to act effectively. To reduce regulatory risks, the authority and functions of 
this regulatory institution should be strengthened immediately in order to 
make it truly independent and professional. 
  Country and sector background  
In 2004, Indonesia had a population of approximately 216 million and 
was the world's fourth most populous country after China, India and the 
United States of America. Population below the poverty line was 36.1 million 
and the unemployment rate was 9.86%. GDP was approximately USD 0.24 
trillion with growth of 5.3% and GDP per capita of USD 1.181. The transport 
and communication sector accounted for 12.70% to GDP growth.  
Total sector revenue for the year 2004 amounted to only USD 4.5 billion. 
Network investment totalled USD 700 million.  Government revenues from 
license fees totalled USD 200 million. Local manufacturing accounted for 
less than 2% of total telecommunication and ICT equipment capital-
expenses, which reached USD 1.5 billions. 
In March 2005, fixed telephone density was barely 4% including FWA-
CDMA limited mobility, while mobile density was approximately 14%.  
Approximately 40% of small townships and 60% of villages do not have any 
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form of communication access. The Internet subscriber base totalled 4 
million, representing 12 million users in 2004. Should GDP growth reach 6-
7% in line with government targets within the next 5 years, then household 
income should rise.  
This, in turn, should boost the purchasing power of households and Small 
to Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) with regard to telecommunication 
services. Teledensity for public access services is projected to reach 30% 
and 50% for cellular by 2015. 
  Pre-competition policy 
Prior to 1995, government performance was very poor, with less than 3 
million telephone lines installed (as shown in the diagram). In order to speed 
up infrastructure development, the private sector was invited to invest in the 
sector in the early 1990s through BOT (Build, Operated, and Transferred) 
and BOO (Build, Operated, and Owned) revenue sharing schemes. High 
investment in fixed wire-line access, of nearly USD 1,000 per line, meant 
that these programs were still not sufficiently attractive to stimulate private 
funding.  Less than 500,000 telephone lines were successfully installed over 
15 years. 
Then, in early 1995, the government tried to encourage investors and 
foreign operators to develop 2.5 million lines in almost all Indonesian 
territories, excluding Jakarta and East Java, with the Joint Operation 
Program (KSO). The latter allows a licensed consortium to build access 
networks and operate services in a specific region. Ownership of the assets 
is typically to revert to TELKOM after 15 years.  
However, this program also failed to attract investors. An economic crisis 
and disputes over legal issues have broken the contract that should normally 
have ended in 2010. Even PT TELKOM has had to pay over USD 1 billion in 
the dispute settlement process and buy back transactions, in return for 1.2 
million additional lines. 
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  Privatization policy 
The privatization of state-owned operators began with the Initial Public 
Offering (IPO) of PT Indosat on the New York Stock Exchange in 1994. It 
continued with the IPO of TELKOM on the New York, London and Jakarta 
Stock Exchanges in late 1995. At the end of 2002, the government divested 
a 41.94% share in PT Indosat to Singapore Technologies Telemedia Pte. 
The government currently owns a 15% stake in the operator. However, the 
government still holds a majority share in PT TELKOM (51.19%) with assets 
worth approximately USD 5.3 billion.  
To strengthen their competitiveness, both major operators have had to 
improve their ability to form partnerships with national and international 
companies. However, privatization in Indonesia has not successfully boosted 
sector performance by improving quality of service to the public. In fact, 
privatization was performed mainly to cover budget deficits and other short-
term government programs.  
Moreover, the privatization process did not comply with good corporate 
governance criteria. This was quite obvious, particularly with PT Indosat's 
privatization, which was considered a major public loss by many parties. 
PSTN and cellular subscriber growth 
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  Oligopoly in cellular service 
In 1995 the government fully opened the cellular service market up to 
private investors. By the end of 2003 there were three large GSM cellular 
operators in Indonesia, Telkomsel, Indosat and Excelcomindo, each with a 
national coverage license.  
In April 2005 the total number of cellular subscribers had reached almost 
30 million, over 90% of which were pre-paid subscribers. However, 
subscribers were concentrated in metropolitan and big cities. This trend is 
projected to continue, as low-income households now aspire to a modern 
lifestyle, in which possessing a cell phone has become a status symbol. 
At the beginning, cellular service liberalization was supposed to meet 
demand in a certain market segment, i.e. mid-to-high income society, 
businessmen and executives. The issue is that the cellular market has 
dominated the telecommunication market and become a substitute for the 
PSTN service market. This is the result of minimal public (PSTN) telephony 
infrastructure. To-date GSM operators have enjoyed excessive profit 
margins, with 60% EBITDA on average. The public has to opt for a cellular 
telephone, despite the fact that this service is very expensive. By early 2003 
per minute cellular tariffs were nearly 20 times greater than PSTN tariffs. 
Now competition in the cellular market is tougher, and the mid-to-low income 
community is being targeted with prepaid starting packs at only USD 3. 
Average ARPU is USD 10 per month. 
Reductions in cellular tariffs began with the launch of the FWA-CDMA 
limited-mobility service as a technology solution adopted by the government 
to accelerate PSTN availability. Currently, the average cellular phone tariff is 
IDR 700 per minute for local calls with a single operator and IDR 1,400 per 
minute for different operators. However, it is still much more expensive than 
the PSTN service, which costs just IDR 250 for two minutes. Moreover, in an 
effort to maintain their dominant positions, these cellular operators are trying 
to influence the regulator with initiatives such as their demand to apply 
limited FWA-CDMA subscriber mobility, whereby subscribers can only travel 
within one BTS area coverage. 
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  Duopoly in fixed access services  
Based on the national telecommunication blue-print defined by the 
government in 1999, local fixed telephony service is monopolized by PT 
TELKOM until 2010 and long distance until 2005, while international fixed-
telephony is monopolized by PT Indosat. However, in mid 2002, the 
government decided to terminate these exclusive rights earlier than 
scheduled by implementing a compensation scheme. The local fixed market 
was liberalized in mid 2002, while the long distance and international 
services markets were privatised in April 2004. Furthermore, the government 
has eliminated assets co-ownership and cross-ownership between PT 
TELKOM and PT Indosat. 
The problem is that the market was privatised by adding just one player 
as the competitor to the incumbent operator. PT Indosat became the new 
entrant in domestic communication services in both the local and long 
distance markets, while PT TELKOM became an international service 
provider. Both companies were also granted spectrum licenses for GSM 
DCS-1800 (2x12.5MHz). Therefore, both companies hold a license to 
become Full Network and Services Provider (FNSP).  On top of voice-based 
services, PT TELKOM and PT Indosat were also granted licenses to provide 
IP-based services such as VoIP and Internet access. 
However, there was a need to evaluate the competitive effectiveness of 
both operators, particularly in an effort to increase communication access for 
public services at affordable price. Moreover, this duopoly structure has 
consolidated PT TELKOM's and PT Indosat's positions to give them "vertical 
integration" in telecommunication services. This may potentially encourage 
anti-trust practices such as the cross-subsidy of competing products and 
those still under monopoly, predatory pricing, service bundling and locking-in 
customers. 
However, the worst fact is that PT Indosat, the new player in the local 
services market, is only interested in Jakarta and Surabaya. In other cities 
PT Indosat will seek business partners with revenue sharing schemes. This 
means that, by possessing a duopoly license, PT Indosat still receives 
royalties from business partners without incurring development and 
operation expenses or taking any risks. It is obvious that with this revenue 
sharing scheme, development is limited by the brokerage fee, i.e. the 
percentage of revenue to be handed over to the license holding operator. 
With such a business strategy PT Indosat will continue to channel its 
investments into the promising cellular and data communication businesses. 
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This year over 85% of Indosat's investment will be allocated to its cellular 
business. It would be better for the government to take prompt action to 
create opportunities for new players who are truly committed, particularly in 
view of their investment capabilities. 
  Fixed wireless access policy 
In order to accelerate penetration rates, the government granted licenses 
to PT TELKOM, PT Indosat and PT Bakrie Telecom (as a region-wide local 
provider) in early 2003 to operate fixed telephony services based on CDMA 
technology as an alternative to the fixed access-network solution. The FWA 
service tariff is equivalent to that of PSTN and has a limited mobility, only 
operating within one local area. From a subscriber's point of view, FWA is an 
attractive alternative option, especially for less mobile users. However, the 
launch of FWA-CDMA has met with fierce resistance from GSM cellular 
operators due to concern over the potential threat that it poses. The FWA-
CDMA network was deployed aggressively by PT TELKOM in early 2003 
and had attracted 2.4 million new subscribers by May 2005.  Most of 
TELKOM's capital expenditure is devoted to limited wireless, rather than 
fixed-telephone lines. TELKOM has deployed a FWA-CDMA limited mobility 
network covering over 195 cities and towns across Indonesia. Its target is to 
attract at least another 2 million new subscribers per year through 2010. It is 
followed by Bakrie Telecom and the latest Indosat, which was just launched 
in early 2004. 
  USO policy 
To develop access communication in remote and isolated areas, each 
operator is obliged to pay an USO contribution of 0.75% of their annual 
revenues. This USO contribution is considered too small compared to 
Malaysia, where the USO contribution is 6% and teledensity has reached 
60%. The government directly manages this USO fund and subcontracts 
development to selected contractors. There is concern over government 
transparency in managing this USO fund. The total revenues from all 
operators amounted to IDR 45 trillion in 2004, while the allocated USO fund 
totalled only IDR 40-45 billion. This indicated that the government was not 
seriously committed to implementing the USO program.  
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In addition, the government has no clear concepts for determining the 
type and quality of service needed. Furthermore, the government must draw 
up a clear plan not simply for providing equipment for the system, but also to 
ensure its smooth operation and maintenance. Many USO facilities are 
currently out of operation since it is unclear who should be responsible for 
their maintenance and its costs. 
  VoIP and Internet policies 
Market liberalization for value added services such as Internet access, 
VoIP and data-communication bases has also been performed by the 
government with fairly relax regulations. The number of licenses for Internet 
access services is not limited, for example. By mid-2003, there were over 
180 Internet Service Providers (ISP). Similarly, the government initially set a 
limit of only 5 VoIP operators. Currently, there are already 12 VoIP 
providers, in which all the major players have shares, such as PT TELKOM, 
Indosat, Satelindo Exelcoma and Bakrie Telecom. The rest are small 
enterprises such as Atlasat, Gaharu, Corbec Communication, Mobicom 
Selularindo, Jasnita Telekomindo, Starcall Siscom and Indopratama 
Teleglobal. 
Operator profiles in Indonesia 
PT Telekomunikasi 
Indonesia, Tbk 
Majority government 
ownership, 51.2%, public 
(46% foreign, 3 % local)  
PSTN (Local, long distance, 
international), VoIP, broadband 
access ADSL, multimedia and 
Internet services 
PT Telkomsel PT TELKOM 65% and SingTel 
35% 
GSM at 900 and 1800 MHz,  
PT Indosat Government ownership 15%, 
STT Singapore 41.94% and  
public (40% foreign, 3%) 
GSM 900 & 1800, PSTN (local, long 
distance, international), broadband 
access, multimedia services, VoIP 
and  Internet 
PT Exelcomindo Telecom Malaysia 27.3%, PT 
Telekomindo Primabhakti  
60%, Asian Infrastructure 
Fund 12.7%  
GSM, VoIP, corporate service 
providers 
PT Bakrie Telecom Bakrie & Brothers Tbk 94%,  
CMA fund Mngnt 6% 
Local PSTN providers, FWA limited 
mobility, CDMA 2000 1X  
PT Lippo Telecom Maxis 51%, Lippo Group 49% GSM provider,3G License Holder, 
not yet operated 
PT Cyber Access Hutchison Int. Hongkong 60%,  3G License Holder, not yet operated 
PT Mobiles 
Telecom 
Bimantara Group CDMA 2000 1X, nation-wide  
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However, from the customer's standpoint, the VoIP service is a substitute 
for long distance and international services, since the VoIP tariff is 40%-50% 
lower than the standard tariff for fixed communications. There is 
consequently a need for further analysis of VoIP regulation to encourage fair 
competition. Due to VoIP each operator is a service operator and currently 
uses the access network developed by the government, so specific 
initiatives are needed to increase penetration rates. For example, obliging 
each VoIP provider to deploy an access network per 300,000 subscribers, 
as was the case in the Philippines. 
  Interconnection dilemmas 
In the case of Indonesia, the incumbent's un-readiness led to serious 
problems with promoting competition, mainly the obligation to provide 
interconnection.  A lack of capacity and the poor quality of the network were 
responsible for technical difficulties in providing an adequate Point of 
Interconnection (PoI) and long delivery times.  In addition, to retain its 
dominant position, the incumbent PT TELKOM made it complicated to 
provide interconnection to other operators. Indeed, the incumbent has not 
yet submitted a Reference of Interconnection Offer (RIO). 
The interconnection privilege has become a dilemma, since new entrants 
with this privilege are only interested in services that do not require 
investment in subscriber development like long distance calls and VoIP. With 
a low PSTN local call tariff, new entrants were able to make huge profits. 
Although the number of new entrants is growing, it has not created any new 
customers. 
Interconnection charges have been determined bilaterally to-date and 
there is no standard charge. This could potentially produce anti-competition 
practices with discrimination and no transparency. Interconnection charges 
from PT TELKOM to Telkomsel may be lower than those to other cellular 
operators since Telkomsel is PT TELKOM's subsidiary. The other problem is 
that the cellular operator holds a dominant position, with the total cellular 
subscriber base reaching 30 million, versus just 9 million PSTN subscribers. 
The interconnection termination charge to cellular telephones consequently 
has to be re-evaluated. To-date the cellular interconnection charge to the 
local PSTN is IDR 125 per minute. From fixed to local cellular the tariff is 
IDR 325 and IDR 450 during peak traffic.  
A. RASYID 71 
The cellular inter-operator termination charge is determined based on a 
closed inter-operator agreement. At present, the average inter-operator call 
rate is around IDR 1,400 per minute. Meanwhile, rates for calls placed with 
one operator are around IDR 700 per minute. Thus the inter-operator call 
rate is twice as high as the rate for calls placed with one operator. This 
shows that it is the customer who bears the extremely high interconnection 
charges of cellular operators. With such tariffs, cellular operators can make 
excessive profit margins and put subscribers at a major disadvantage. 
  Tariff rebalancing 
PSTN tariff is currently still regulated by the government, despite 
competition especially in the local service and long distance markets. In the 
monopoly era the low PSTN local tariffs were not an issue as development 
expenses were incurred by the government. Indeed, PSTN service was 
categorized as a public service, with low purchasing power and price 
sensitive characteristics. Meanwhile, to offset this service, the long distance 
rate was increased to act as a cross-subsidy.  
Now, low local tariffs have become a factor that discourages investors 
from developing a subscriber network. Local termination interconnection 
charge is set at 50% of the local service charge, i.e. IDR 62.50 per minute. 
Such low local call tariffs should benefit new entrants to the long distance 
and VoIP services markets. Meanwhile, the incumbent has less incentive to 
invest in the subscriber access network. Many VoIP providers can 
immediately access incumbent subscribers by just setting up their gateways. 
Hence new entrants can turn huge profit without making major investments.  
In the case of Indonesia, tariff rebalancing is intended to stimulate 
investors to develop access networks. In the year 2000, the government 
decided to increase local tariffs by 46% in three phases. In 2002, PSTN tariff 
was increased by 15% for local calls, long distance calls and monthly fees 
without rebalancing. In 2004, the second PSTN tariff increase of around 15% 
with tariff rebalancing was implemented, hence the effective increase in local 
call prices totalled 28%, the monthly fee 24%, while long distance charges 
dropped by 3%. The government still plans to rebalance tariffs again to bring 
the effective increase in local call charges and monthly fees up to 28%, and 
the total decrease in long distance call costs to 27%. After the second 
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increase and rebalancing, the current local call tariff is IDR 250 per 2 
minutes, while the long distance charge is IDR 66 per pulse.  
The problem is that the current PSTN local tariff is considered as 
extremely expensive from a public purchasing power perspective. In 
Malaysia, for example, the local tariff was IDR 92 per minute after tariff 
rebalancing in 2002, whereas the country's GDP was nearly USD 8,920 per 
capita (GDP ppp, WorldBank, 2002). In Indonesia, by comparison, the local 
call tariff has currently reached IDR 125 per minute, whereas the GDP per 
capita is just USD 3,300 (GDP ppp, WorldBank). 
  Spectrum frequency licensing  
The current licensing process for spectrum utilization lacks transparency. 
Without clear criteria and a selection mechanism, the government is prone to 
granting licenses to dubious candidates. The licensing process is suspected 
to be completely corrupt, involving collusion, and nepotism. As a result, 
spectrum utilization efficiency is far too low. What is worse, many licenses 
are only kept as future businesses.  
Moreover, the determination of spectrum bandwidth is performed without 
clear justifications. One operator, for example, owns 2x10MHz, but has only 
used 2x2Mhz for many years. Furthermore, spectrum allocation is 
considered a chaotic mess. The downlink frequency of FWA-CDMA 2000 
1X, for instance, is located on the uplink frequency of 3G. Aside from guard 
band requirement, some 3G downlink frequencies could consequently not be 
used.  
The government recently issued two 3G spectrum licenses, giving rise to 
protests inside and outside the country. At first the 2x15MHz 3G spectrum 
license was granted for Cyber Access Communication (CAC). Although the 
license was attributed via a beauty contest, the criteria and selection process 
were considered unfair and biased by the government. What is worse, the 
3G license for Lippo Telecom was awarded without any selection process. 
The irrationality of this attribution was clear from the operator's inability to 
deploy a 3G network. In fact, Lippo Telecom, which also received a GSM 2G 
license in 2002, has only 25,000 subscribers to-date. Indeed, CAC has not 
shown any serious commitment to making investments to-date, despite 
holding a 3G license since 2003. Suddenly, in early 2005, both enterprises 
relinquished their shares to foreign investors. 
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Formally, spectrum is granted free of charge without any entrant-fee at 
all. Such a policy would certainly disadvantage the government. In reality, 
the 3G spectrum licenses for CAC and Lippo Telecom were merely used to 
increase their respective market values. Within just 3 months of receiving a 
3G spectrum license, Lippo Telecom was able to pocket USD 100 million for 
the sale of 51% of its shares to Maxis. A similar case occurred with the sale 
of 60% of CAC shares to Hutchison International Hongkong for USD 120 
million.  
These transactions confirmed that both enterprises were capitalising on 
their licences, meanwhile the government as the spectrum owner remained 
empty-handed. These transactions also imply that not only 3G spectrum was 
sold, but also the 2G DCS 1800 2x10MHz (FDD) spectrum and 1x5MHz 
TDD owned by both enterprises. This reveals that the government does not 
realize that spectrum frequencies are scarce resources which need to be 
properly managed to achieve optimal utilization in the public's best interests. 
  Carrier selection 
To promote competition on a level playing field, PT Indosat, the new 
entrant in the long distance service market, urged the government to apply 
access code 01x to all players, incumbents and new entrants. In April 2004 
the government then decided to alter the long distance access code 
commonly used during PT TELKOM's monopoly. This meant that the PT 
TELKOM long distance access code had to be altered from simply dialling 0-
ABC- to 01x-ABC-. The government has allowed one year for PT TELKOM 
to set up the access code modification. 
In reality, this decree had not been implemented by April 1st, 2005.  The 
access code modification 017 for PT TELKOM will be performed gradually 
and should be completed within 5 years. As a temporary solution, 
subscribers can still used the dial number 0-ABC- XXXXXXX as usual and 
the 011 access code will be used to select Indosat. In areas where 
technically feasible, the 017 access code will be gradually implemented. PT 
TELKOM is used to applying 017 as a VoIP service access code. Therefore, 
as of January 1st, 2006, all VoIP service access codes will be exchanged for 
5 digit-numbers. 
This rescheduling is typically due to the unavailability of an appropriate 
facility in PT TELKOM's switching and signalling systems. This also confirms 
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that the government, as the majority shareholder in PT TELKOM, has no 
established policies, concepts or plans for dealing with the market 
transformation from a monopoly to a competitive environment, especially 
with regard to preparations to increase the capacity and quality of the 
network. This also indicates that the government's decision was unrealistic 
and based on no previous consideration of whether it could be implemented 
or not. For such long distance access code modification requires 
replacement of most currently installed switching equipment. The 
implementation will clearly require a significant financing and will be 
impossible to accomplish within a one year period. Based on PT TELKOM's 
calculation, it will cost around USD 340 million and take 5 years to complete. 
Aside from the issue of the incumbent operator's un-readiness, the 
decision to alter this access code also shows that the government has no 
clear strategy or priorities in terms of accomplishing liberalization goals. In 
view of the huge budget required for access code modification, it would be 
better if these funds were used to develop the access network, hence 
increasing penetration rates. 
  Competition policy 
In order to promote sector reform and competition, the current policy and 
regulatory framework is governed by the Telecommunications Act No. 
36/1999, Competition Act No. 5/1999 and Investment Act No. 1/1967.  
However, in reality this framework cannot respond to market dynamics and 
swift technological changes. 
At a strategic level, the government has no clear visions, missions or 
strategies for exploring opportunities in this sector to promote economic 
growth.  On an operational level, the structure of the telecommunications 
providing industry, as defined in Telecommunication Act No. 36/1999 and in 
the sector blueprint, is not conducive to industry growth. Creating a duopoly 
market structure for PSTN services (local, long distance and international 
calls) by introducing one competitor is not enough to encourage competition. 
Similarly, existing regulations tend to enable one operator to be present in all 
industry segments (vertical integration). This makes it hard to control anti-
competition practices such as cross-subsidy, locking-in customers and 
bundling. 
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In Indonesia in particular, a lack of awareness with regard to legal and 
business ethics has led to repeated misconduct by the incumbent and even 
new entrants. Furthermore, there is no transparency or accountability in 
government policy, which has created ineffective competition and 
exacerbated the sector's growth performance. All of these factors confirm 
that the government lacks the relevant expertise to elaborate effective policy 
or a suitable regulatory framework to accommodate the transition from a 
monopoly to a competitive market. 
In the mean time, the prohibition of monopoly practices as defined in Act 
No. 5/1999 applies to all industries. However, this indicator is inappropriate 
to the telecommunications sector, as if the indicator that defines the 
dominant position of one operator in a given market segment as a 50% or 
75% market share for two or more players. This indicator is too high for the 
telecommunications sector. It could consequently enable one operator to 
grow and dominate the market ahead of time. This can be seen in the 
oligopoly of the cellular service market, which is dominated by three major 
operators i.e. Telkomsel, Indosat, Excelcomindo which have 53%, 32% and 
14% of market share respectively. Thus the cellular tariff service remains 
very expensive. This is because cellular service tariffs are fully controlled by 
these three operators, making competition ineffective. 
  Foreign investment policy 
In fact, the legislative framework and foreign investment regulations need 
to be reviewed.  The Foreign Investment Act No. 1/1967 has also not been 
amended yet. In the Act, the telecommunications sector is one of the eight 
strategic industries banned to foreign investors. In reality, everything 
changes. Foreign investors have bought into all telecommunication 
operators directly or indirectly through share ownership in the capital 
markets. PT Indosat,  for example, is 42% owned by STT, Telkomsel is 35% 
owned by Singtel and Telekom Malaysia has a 27% stake in Excelcom.  
Based on Government Decree No. 20/1994, the telecommunications 
sector is open to foreign investment of up to 95% via the local investor joint 
venture scheme. However, Presidential Decree 96/2000 absolutely prohibits 
frequency spectrum management and allocation for foreign parties, with 
foreign investment restricted to 49% in the telecommunications sector. 
However, not even one month after its pronouncement, the Presidential 
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Decree 96/2000 was amended by Presidential Decree 118/2000. Based on 
negotiations with the WTO, it specified a maximum limit of 35% for foreign 
investment in the telecommunication sector and 40% within ASEAN. This all 
shows that there is no legal consistency, which could be a barrier and 
serious problem for investors. 
It is necessary to understand the structure and characteristics of the 
telecommunication industry in order to formulate satisfactory policies. The 
government should be able to distinguish between foreign investment policy 
for the equipment manufacturing industry and policy for the service industry. 
To develop manufacturing, the government even needs to encourage 100% 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to encourage foreign enterprises to build 
their plants in the country. In addition to creating job opportunities, this would 
make the country more than a target market. Nevertheless, the 
telecommunication service industry has to be carefully assessed, particularly 
in terms of the facilities and frequency spectrum available. The question is, 
whether such a promising service industry should be fully occupied by 
foreign investors?  
This is where government control is required to protect this strategic 
industry sector. One way that the government can exercise power is to 
control frequency spectrum allocation. Similarly, spectrum should not be 
granted to enterprises with foreign ownership that exceeds a certain base 
value. 
  Establishing BRTI 
Unlike European countries, after almost 10 years, liberalization and 
competition have taken effect in Indonesia without the intervention of 
independent regulatory institutions. Key roles and functions were directly 
exercised by the government, in this case the Minister of Transport. 
Meanwhile, the government is also a majority shareholder in PT TELKOM, 
the incumbent operator and dominant player in both fixed and cellular 
services. Even the Director General for Post and Telecommunications 
(DGPT) was appointed a commissioner at PT TELKOM. Government 
intervention and conflicts of interests consequently explain the sector's 
extremely poor performance. 
The BRTI was established in early January 2004 and conceived as an 
independent, professional regulatory institution for the promotion of 
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competition. BRTI consists of five committees (the DGPT executive with four 
experts), supported operationally by DGPT staff. This means that DGPT still 
exercises the regulatory function, with an altered executive structure. This is 
intended to make each decision a collegial decision to ensure the regulator's 
transparency, neutrality and accountability. 
However, in reality it does not work that way. The BRTI committee is not 
combined with the DGPT and has no direct line of command to existing 
DGPT staff as a result. What is worse, the BRTI committee has no authority 
to unveil any decisions as BRTI resolutions have to take the form of a 
ministry or DGPT head decision. This is clearly inconsistent with the concept 
and goals behind the founding of the BRTI. 
This condition is attributed to the vague legal status and foundation of the 
BRTI. Its role and authority are also vague and could be challenged by the 
government. The fact that the government had no serious intention of 
establishing an independent regulator was clear from the preparation of 
Telecommunication Act No. 36/1999. After much wrangling, the Independent 
Regulatory Board (IRB) was merely mentioned in the description of the Act. 
Hence, the BRTI does not have a firm, legitimate basis. 
Furthermore, BRTI only has the authority to regulate network provider 
and basic telecommunication services due for competition. Meanwhile value 
added services like VoIP and other multimedia are still controlled by the 
DGPT as the government's right hand. The same applies to the 
management of private closed user groups like banking and oil-company 
networks. This shows that major "businesses" long regulated by the DGPT 
cannot not be touched. 
Although things have changed with the BRTI, the DGPT to-date has no 
mechanism and process for ensuring transparency and fairness in each 
unveiled regulation. As usual, ministry decrees can show up without public 
consultation. One ministry decree could be inconsistent with another and 
conflict with existing law. Indeed, some ministry decrees are considered full 
of "sponsor" interest.  
The BRTI committee members selection process is also questionable, 
and it remains doubtful whether candidates were selected based on the 
requirement criteria. The selected candidates should be professionals who 
are prepared to become regulators with recognized competencies, as well 
as national and international visions in telecommunication business 
management. They should not be newcomers to the telecommunication 
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business. To attract experts, the government certainly needs to provide 
reasonable remuneration. This is a very sensitive issue and the regulator 
position is prone to corruption, collusion and nepotism. Integrity and a clean 
track record are crucial attributes for BRTI committee members. 
  Conclusions and recommendations 
Liberalization and sector reform in Indonesia were supposed to increase 
teledensity. After a decade, the partial liberalization process has not realised 
the goals envisaged. Growth in teledensity and sector productivity remain 
low. This confirms that liberalization and sector reform have not been 
effective in accelerating the public availability of telecoms services. Low 
sector performance has led to a minimum sector contribution to accelerating 
national economic growth in the effort to eradicate poverty and 
unemployment and improve national education.  
It also shows that the government doesn't have clear objectives or the 
right strategies to encourage sector development. Lack of a state budget for 
infrastructure development, inappropriate policies and regulatory frameworks 
and poor government performance are the three key issues that have led to 
an unsatisfactory form of liberalization.  A lot of policies and regulations do 
not encourage industry growth. The introduction of the BOT and Joint 
Operation Scheme (KSO) failed to accelerate penetration. Economic crises 
and legal disputes have raised crucial issues for achieving the target as 
envisaged. A duopoly policy for the local PSTN network has also failed to 
increase penetration rates. Meanwhile, high cellular service prices and an 
oligopoly in the cellular market has led to excessive profit margins. The 
existing spectrum licensing shows that the government has no commitment 
to optimizing the utilization of scarce resources. Many license holders are 
just holding onto the spectrum for later to protect their business interests. 
There is no transparency or credibility in the licensing process to promote 
competition. The un-readiness of the incumbent's network, the licensing of 
scarce resources, interconnection and local PSTN tariff regulations have 
been become serious dilemmas and handicaps to promoting effective 
competition. Even the set up of the BRTI has not reduced regulatory risks or 
attracted investment. 
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In the effort to accelerate telecommunication infrastructure development, 
a new set of policies will be required to encourage market growth in a 
climate of fair competition. New policies should cover the following points: 
• On a strategic level, country leadership is required to optimize sector 
opportunities as an engine for economic growth. A clear vision, national 
policy objectives and strategies must be defined.  
• The PSTN duopoly must be immediately terminated. A more effective 
industry structure needs to be prepared to encourage competition in the 
local market. A local license with a neutral technology is expected to 
increase market penetration. Similarly, more players in long distance and 
international services will reduce current high call rates. National asset 
utilization should be optimised by opening up opportunities for electricity and 
railway companies as regional backbone providers. In the transition period, 
some specific initiatives are required to anticipate "cherry picking" by new 
entrants and to reinforce their commitment to increase network expansion. 
Such specific policies could still be applied until a teledensity of 50% has 
been achieved or until all households have access to basic communication 
service. 
• Empowering local government is a strategic step to accelerate the 
opening up of local markets. Authority delegation to local government is a 
crucial to the success of local market liberalisation; especially the authority 
to grant local licenses according to selection criteria and mechanisms 
determined by the BRTI. Clear segregation of authority between central and 
provincial government is required immediately, especially the authorization 
to manage spectrum frequency and numbering as scarce resources should 
be held by the BRTI. 
• Reinforcing the BRTI's legal basis and status to give it greater 
independence and professionalism. This calls for a clear definition of 
functions and authority, financial resources, reasonable remuneration and 
good facilities for committees. Intensive capacity building programs for 
central and local government staff to train as experts are also needed.  
• Preparing a conducive and more competitive investment policy, to 
attract local and foreign investment. One-stop services may be one way of 
facilitating and accelerating the investment process. 
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